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ABSTRACT 
This paper1 revisits the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and corruption. Earlier literature 
argues that ethnic fractionalization leads to corruption via mechanisms involving ethnic in-group 
favoritism. In this study, an alternative theory suggests that the causal relationship runs in the other 
direction: when the political system is corrupt and fails to deliver security, voters will fall back on 
ethnic institutions. This creates the stronger patterns of ethnic identity and ethnic voting that we see 
in countries considered to be ethnically fractionalized. Conducting three analyses: a regression and 
an instrumental variable design on the country level, and an individual level analysis on party prefer-
ences from the Afrobarometer dataset, the thesis finds support for the alternative theory. 
 
Keywords: ethnic fractionalization, corruption, ethnic voting 
 
   
                                                     
1 This is a revised version of my master’s thesis with the same name, finished in May 2019. The empirical material has 
not changed, but large parts of the theory and presentation have improved since. 
Håkan Bernhardsson 
Department of Political Science 
University of Gothenburg 
hakber@gmail.com 
 
  3 
Introduction 
Previous studies of the link between ethnic fractionalization and corruption have provided much 
evidence for a correlation between ethnic fractionalization and corruption (Mauro, 1995, 1998; La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & 
Wacziarg, 2003; Alesina & Ferrara, 2005; Glaeser & Saks, 2006; Dincer, 2008). The causal direction 
between the two variables is generally proposed to go from ethnic fractionalization to corruption, at 
least when it is explicitly mentioned. However, the previous literature has not provided much empir-
ical evidence for that ethnic fractionalization causes corruption. A handful of papers lay out a theory 
regarding the causal direction, which is in most cases built on the notion that an inherent ethnic in-
group favoritism will lead citizens to prefer their co-ethnics and therefore, conduct in corrupt prac-
tices. 
This paper will investigate the notion that an inherent ethnic in-group favoritism leads to corruption 
with the hypothesis of a reverse causal direction between the two variables. The empirics that are 
presented in the paper concern the degree of ethnic voting in Africa, based on the degree of corrup-
tion in countries and the degree of perception of corruption among individuals. The theoretic moti-
vation for that corruption leads to ethnic in-group favoritism is to a great extent built on the work of 
North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), and the paper suggests that patron-client networks take over 
state functions such as upholding the safety of individuals and property in corrupt societies. These 
patron-client networks rely on the cultural habits of its members to uphold elite privileges without 
the use of physical force. Enough large absence of state institutions is hypothesized to make ethnic 
“natural states” implode under the patron-client practices to the extent that it leads to ethnic frac-
tionalization. Conversely, the “open-access society”, in which corruption is absent, will promote val-
ues of equality and promote blind justice, regardless of elite status or cultural background among 
citizens. 
The results of the analyses conducted in the paper point towards that corruption cause ethnic in-
group favoritism, rather than the other way around. Such a causal direction contradicts the notion 
that ethnic fractionalization leads to corruption because of an inherent ethnic in-group favoritism. 
This paper will proceed as follows: First I will go through the previous research, and especially the 
theoretic motivations in several papers that suggest causal relationships where ethnic fractionalization 
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is the independent variable. I will then suggest an alternative theoretical framework. I will then pre-
sent a research strategy, present results and discuss the implications of the findings. 
Previous research 
Corruption generally has negative consequences for human development, as it both reduces eco-
nomic growth and the quality of social services, which means that corruption is negatively correlated 
with, for example, life expectancy, educational attainment, the standard of living and literacy. The 
absence of corruption is also a component in Quality of Government, which is positively correlated 
with environmental sustainability, economic equality, and other measures (Holmberg, Rothstein, & 
Nasiritousi, 2009). 
Ethnic fractionalization has been suggested as one of many causes of corruption in previous literature 
(Mauro, 1995, 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Alesina, Devleeschauwer, 
Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003; Alesina & Ferrara, 2005; Glaeser & Saks, 2006; Dincer, 2008). If 
ethnic fractionalization leads to corruption, it should also lead to several negative outcomes that are 
correlated with corruption, which has been suggested by other scholars. Studies from the USA show 
that cities that are ethnically fractionalized prefer lower taxes above public goods provisions (Alesina, 
Baqir, & Easterly, 1999). Ethnic fractionalization is also negatively correlated with economic growth, 
quality of policies, and quality of institutions at a country-level (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, 
Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003). 
Some of the most cited papers that suggest a causal direction in which ethnic fractionalization per se 
leads to corruption are Mauro (1998), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999), 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003), which are papers that lack thorough 
and explicit theory about the mechanisms of ethnic fractionalization. In the next section follows a 
walkthrough of some papers that motivate a theory behind why ethnic fractionalization can affect 
both corruption and other related variables, as an orientation to the current state of theory, and 
criticism of the strengths and weaknesses of each respective theory. 
Alesina and Ferrara (2005) propose three reasons behind the causal direction between ethnic frac-
tionalization and corruption. The rest of the theoretical motivations will be categorized after their 
similarity with Alesina and Ferrara (2005), as all cited papers bear similarity to that work. The first 
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explanation is ethnic in-group favoritism, meaning the aggregation of individual preferences of at-
tributing positive utility to the well-being of one’s group. Putnam (2007) carries on this idea, using 
ethnic categories as a base for social identities, where the distance between social identities should 
lead to distrust and vice versa. Using this logic, Putnam argues that ethnic fractionalization leads to 
lower levels of social trust, lower confidence in local government, or lower likelihood of giving to 
charities, and he supports his claims with data from the USA. The theory does, however, have con-
tradictory empirical findings, as it also shows that the ethnic in-group levels of trust will decrease in 
ethnic groups in ethnically diverse communities, while the differences between ethnic in-group trust 
and trust towards other ethnicities are uncorrelated with fractionalization (Putnam, 2007). 
Dincer (2008) refers to that in-group favoritism within ethnicities can be a source for corruption. In 
his short motivation for the in-group favoritism among co-ethnics, he refers to the works the anthro-
pologist Van den Berghe (1987) and Vanhanen (1999) for further reading. However, Van den Berghe 
(1987) suggests that the type of social networks that can be subject to in-group favoritism consist of 
a few hundred members, meaning that a theory built on his work regarding ethnic in-group favoritism 
should be flawed when applied to ethnicities that can amount to up to millions of members. 
Vanhanen (1999, 2012a, 2012b) suggests that “we can trace the roots of ethnic conflict and violence 
to human nature” (Vanhanen, 2012a), and defines what he calls ethnic nepotism, which he argues is 
an evolutionary drive for favoring one’s ethnicity. He supports his theory by establishing the corre-
lation between ethnic fractionalization and ethnic interest conflicts in countries (Vanhanen, 2012a). 
However, ethnic fractionalization should be a necessary precondition for ethnic interest conflicts, 
and there should be little need of studying the extent of ethnic interest conflicts in homogeneous 
countries. Van den Berghe (1987) also argues that in most cases when genetic differences can be 
observed between people, this is the result of long-distance migration. Ethnic interest conflicts, such 
as conflicts between tribes, should instead at least historically have occurred in environments in which 
it is almost impossible to decide ethnicity based on appearance. It should also be noted that many 
ethnic conflicts are built upon religion and/or language, rather than “race”. 
The second explanation by Alesina and Ferrara (2005) is that ethnicity affects the strategies that in-
dividuals use during market transactions. In places with market failures, ethnic affiliation is used as a 
reputation mechanism, which evens out information asymmetry, with the side effect of losses 
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attributed to generalizations. Ethnicities will mainly be necessary when legal contracts cannot be en-
forced due to weak institutions, as the stakes of economic cooperation are not as high where there 
are means to resolve legal disputes. This implies that ethnicities play a particularly important role 
when the legal power of the state is weak, which means that state institutions play an essential role in 
explaining ethnic conflicts. This points to a causal direction from weak state institutions to ethnic in-
group favoritism. 
Glaeser and Saks (2006) propose that if corruption is introduced, to begin with, it will persist in 
ethnically fractionalized societies, as voters will not be interested in removing the leaders in charge 
of the corruption as long as they provide resources to the voter’s ethnic group. Their model at best 
implies that ethnic fractionalization can be preserved or increased in already corrupt societies, but 
not why ethnic fractionalization leads to corruption, to begin with. They investigate their theory using 
an OLS regression, but there is no obvious reason as to why there should exist a linear relationship 
between ethnic fractionalization and corruption if the causality is solely built on that other variables 
are a prerequisite for corruption. 
The third explanation by Alesina and Ferrara (2005) relates to that the cost of production increases 
with ethnic diversity as a result of difficulties in communication over lingual or cultural lines. This 
theoretic motivation, however, loses much of its explanatory power when applied to other types of 
differences than languages, such as race or religion, as they should technically not affect communica-
tion so much. 
One of the most thoroughly defined theories regarding the causal relationship between ethnic frac-
tionalization and corruption is Cerqueti, Coppier, and Piga (2012), who have created an advanced 
model to investigate details of the relationship. In sum, they propose a principal-agent environment 
consisting of entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, and controllers. Entrepreneurs rely on bureaucrats to run 
their businesses, and the bureaucrats are controlled by the controllers who can give them fines if they 
do not follow the laws. In the model, the controllers are assumed not to report the activity of bu-
reaucrats belonging to the same ethnicity. Another assumption of the model is that a higher fraction-
alization will increase the monitoring costs due to communications barriers which should, in turn, 
reduce the monitoring level, and thereby increase the level of corruption. There will, therefore, exist 
an optimal monitoring level for the state, where the monitoring costs and the losses of corruption 
are balanced. All actors in the model are assumed to act rationally except the controllers, that do not 
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maximize utility because of assumed characteristics of ethnicity. Moreover, the thought of non-cor-
rupt controllers is an exciting assumption as the other type of bureaucrats in the model are assumed 
to be as corrupt as possible. However, in this model, the controllers even have a corrupt function. 
The principal-agent assumptions in the modeling of corruption have also been criticized for a mis-
characterization of systemic corruption (Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013). The internal contra-
dictions among the assumptions, as well as the issue with external validity to systemic corruption 
make the model flawed. In summary, much of the previous research suggests that ethnic fractionali-
zation leads to corruption and other negative outcomes, but few scholars have a thorough theoretical 
foundation for their claims. Those who have an explicit theory regarding the effects of ethnic frac-
tionalization, generally base their theories on that people are inherently subjects of ethnic in-group 
favoritism. The possibility for a reverse correlation or impact from ethnic fractionalization through 
a spurious relationship has not been discussed in the presented literature. 
Theory 
The proposed theory outlined in this paper suggests that ethnic identities are neither given from 
nature nor the Tower of Babel, but rather through political interaction within groups with shared 
interests in security. Another theoretic viewpoint that will be challenged is that people will favor their 
co-ethnics under all circumstances. A contending explanation of the correlation between ethnic frac-
tionalization and corruption will be suggested, based on the work by North, Wallis, and Weingast 
(2009), who have studied the evolution from what they call natural states to open-access societies. 
According to the theory, in very small societies, consisting of a group of families that all know each 
other, the person or group of people who are best at coercing others by violence or threats of violence 
will gain power by upholding the security of others. When a society gets so big that one cannot 
possibly know each member of the society on a personal basis, the coercion by the ruling elites, which 
is a requirement for the absence of violence, cannot build on individual relations. In societies larger 
than around 1000 members, “individual relationships cannot be based solely on personal knowledge 
and trust; they must be reinforced by the web of interests created by the social order” (North, Wallis, 
& Weingast, 2009). 
Some of the earliest human civilizations have been theocracies, that extract rent from society to 
priest-politicians. The social consequences of organized religion also help the authorities maintain 
social control, but religion is not completely necessary to maintain the interests of elites (North, 
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Wallis, & Weingast, 2009). One’s culture will contain a set of values regarding how to interact with 
others, and breaking the conventions will result in punishment from the surroundings. As the social 
order is built as a patron-client-network, with the elites responsible for the security of a community 
in the top, there are great incentives for cooperation within the network, as one’s position in society 
depends upon the goodwill in the personal relationship with people higher up in the hierarchy. Nat-
ural states limit the ability to create organizations that are separated from personality and identity 
(North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009). Therefore, ethnicity and cultural upbringing, rather than a some-
what independent civil society, becomes a more evident base for political mobilization in the natural 
state. 
In the open-access society, the police and the courts will uphold impersonal security, meaning it is 
independent of personal relations and personally motivated actions from the ruling elites. Such a 
society will lead to the promotion of beliefs about inclusion, equality and shared growth, which will 
be norms based on the reality of perceived fairness of opportunity and impartial distribution of wel-
fare (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009). In contrast, the police and courts in a natural state will likely 
depend upon the personal characteristics and properties of the rulers in charge of those functions, 
and act directly in their interests. 
In countries with dysfunctional state institutions, the shared beliefs within a culture will lead its mem-
bers to embrace the means of upholding their security — namely to submit to a ruling elite that relies 
on cultural rules to secure the community from violence. The theory bears much resemblance to the 
thoughts of Marx and Gramsci, who argue that religion and culture are used by the elites to maintain 
class society, with the addition of North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) that the absence of violence 
makes such an order much more tolerable for the people. 
I suggest that ethnicities can be a base for a natural state, as ethnicity is often built on at least one of 
the two foundations culture and religion. I also suggest that ethnicity is more of an artifact from 
earlier times in countries that can be characterized as open-access orders. 
A consequence of the connection between the ethnicity and natural states that depend upon person-
alized patron-client networks is that such networks should implode under their weight when they 
become so large that too many people are involved, and too many personal relationships need to be 
maintained to extract rents to the elites. Under these circumstances, the ruling elites might either 
implement a more efficient bureaucracy in the rent extraction, meaning less corruption or the patron-
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client networks can divide into new hierarchies that can either choose to co-operate or struggle with 
each other. Such a mechanism could explain a causal direction going from corruption to ethnic frac-
tionalization. 
If people are used to that the institutions that govern their behavior only apply to particular parts of 
the population, and that universal welfare is impossible due to corruption, it is not so surprising that 
voters will vote for particularized welfare, meaning transfers from tax to particular groups, as a quest 
for a fair provisions of public goods. The most practical way of arranging such clientelist practices 
will be through the transfer of public goods to ethnic groups, as they already have cohesion and 
identity that can be mobilized in elections. In other words, in a very corrupt country, the only collec-
tive action that could at least guarantee some welfare to one’s collective group would be to vote for 
that public goods should be distributed in a particularistic manner. 
Orjuela (2014) argues that the sentiment of “it is our time to eat” might drive ethnic minorities to-
wards voting according to their ethnic interests if they already are discriminated against politically. 
The plain fear of being disfavored by what other ethnic groups would do with their power could turn 
voters belonging to the majority groups toward ethnic parties even though the voters are not primar-
ily motivated by ethno-nationalistic tendencies, but just a fear of repression and a fear of losing ma-
terial privileges. In summary, the natural state that is characterized by a dependence upon personal 
relationships will be built on networks of favors and co-favors, meaning corruption and a need for 
ethnic in-group favoritism. Meanwhile, the open-access order will be characterized by the absence of 
personal relationships as the base for public interaction, meaning an absence of corruption and values 
of equality between ethnicities among the population. This is modeled in figure 1. 
Based on the proposed theory, I will investigate the hypothesis: Corruption will lead to ethnic in-group 
favoritism. 
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FIGURE 1, VISUALIZATION OF PROPOSED THEORETICAL MECHANISMS 
 
 
Research strategy 
This study will be conducted at two levels. I will first study the country-level effects of corruption on 
ethnic in-group favoritism, measured as ethnic voting. The first aim is to establish whether or not we 
can observe a correlation between corruption and ethnic voting, using regression analysis. Without 
establishing a correlation, it should be very improbable with a causal relationship. 
The second aim of the country-level analysis is to test the hypothesis that corruption per se leads to 
ethnic voting and that the phenomenon is neither explained by a spurious relationship, nor by reverse 
causality. As this paper criticizes much of the previous theory that is built upon that inherent ethnic 
grievances and ethnic in-group favoritism lead to corruption, I will also employ an instrumental var-
iable regression, as the causality and causal direction are highly relevant. The purpose of the instru-
mental variable regression is to get as close to an experimental setting as possible, by isolating the 
effects of corruption on ethnic voting to the greatest possible extent. 
  11 
The answer to whether individuals who perceive a high degree of corruption will vote for ethnic 
parties to a greater extent, it yet another piece of evidence to the question of the causal mechanism 
between corruption and ethnic in-group favoritism. The suggested theory proposes that natural states 
will lead to more corruption, which leads individuals to understand that universal welfare is impossi-
ble and that their ethnic group is necessary for their welfare and security. From that suggestion fol-
lows that corruption should lead the individual to embrace their ethnicity, which includes voting for 
an ethnic party. If we can measure a correlation between the perception of corruption and ethnic 
voting on the individual level, the findings will suggest that the theory is plausible in this regard. 
How should this research design respond to a reality in line with the antithesis to the hypothesis 
suggested in this paper, that ethnic fractionalization leads to ethnic voting, which leads to corruption? 
The correlation should still be established. The reverse causality should be caught by the instrumental 
variable regression, but there is always a risk of a false positive. In the individual study, there should 
however be no obvious reason for the perception of corruption to be correlated with ethnic voting, 
as the corruption caused by ethnic voting should be equally noticeable. A summary of the research 
strategy and how it will respond to the underlying data be in figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2 VISUALIZATION OF THE STEPS INVOLVED IN THE RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
 
The combined results of an individual level study and two country-level studies should give us a fairly 
good view of how the structural effects of corruption cause ethnic voting on a macro-level as well as 
on a micro-level. 
Data 
The primary sources of data in this study are the Afrobarometer and the Quality of Government 
dataset (Bratton, Mattes, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2015; Teorell et al., 2019). The Afrobarometer rounds 
span over the years 2005, 2008, 2013 and 2016. A summary of the sources of the variables can be 
found in the appendix. 
  13 
Operationalization 
In this study, ethnic in-group favoritism will be operationalized as ethnic voting in parliamentary 
elections. The motivation for the usage is that the choice of a party that specifically champions one’s 
ethnic group is a form of ethnic in-group favoritism, as it can both indicate the voter’s intentions of 
favoring his or her group for office, or it can indicate how the politician or the political party favorites 
particular ethnicities. 
The definition of ethnic voting will use the ethnic fractionalization within a party at the individual 
level, which makes it a classification based on which ethnic group a majority of the voters for a party 
belongs to, to use the phrasing by (Chandra, 2011). The definition of ethnic voting in each country 
will be: (∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑗
2𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑗=1 ) ∙ (∑ 𝑟𝑖 ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗
2𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠
𝑗=1
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑖=1 ), where 𝑝𝑖  stands for the 
fraction of ethnic group i to the entire population, 𝑞𝑖𝑗  stands for the size of party j in ethnic group i. 
𝑟𝑖 stands for the fraction of party r to the entire population, while 𝑠𝑖𝑗  means the size of ethnic group 
j in party i. 
This method was originally used in a master’s thesis by El Koubi (2016) who has also attached an 
example of how the calculation is done in practice in her appendix. The method is an interaction by 
two of Chandra’s (2011) four methods of deciding the degree that a party is an ethnic party, namely 
a classification based on how a majority of an ethnic group votes multiplied by which ethnic group a 
majority of the voters for a party belongs to, for all parties and ethnic groups in a country. The 
motivation for this measure is, to begin with, a practical issue of the difficulty in deciding both the 
"de jure"-content of party manifestos from an entire continent, but it can also be advantageous use 
"de facto"-popularity in ethnic groups, as all ethnic voting patterns will not be conducted on formally 
ethnic parties. A continuous variable for the degree of ethnic voting for a party also has the advantage 
of bringing more possible nuance to the measures and results than a simple dummy variable ap-
proach. 
The definitions of the other variables used in this study can be found in the appendix. 
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FIGURE 3 VISUALIZATION OF THE POSSIBLE CAUSAL RELATIONS INVOLVED 
 
The mutual relationships between ethnic fractionalization, ethnic voting, and corruption 
In figure 3, I list all possible ways in which ethnic fractionalization can be an independent variable 
that is consistent with that ethnic voting and corruption can be correlated. The modeled causal rela-
tions do not contain feedback loops, but feedback loops that do not feedback to ethnic fractionali-
zation are simply combinations of two or more models in the figure. 
Model A, which is perhaps the most employed in the earlier literature, will both be caught by the 
instrumental variable study and the individual study, as their purpose is to decide the causal direction 
involved. The same goes for model D, which contains the same direction of causality between ethnic 
fractionalization and ethnic voting. Model C should result in the instrument being correlated with the 
error term in the instrumental variable study, and should not result in a significant relationship in the 
individual study. Model E should lead us to find a significant correlation between ethnic fractionali-
zation and ethnic voting, also when corruption is introduced in the model if the regression can meas-
ure such an effect. 
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The remaining model is model B, in which ethnic fractionalization leads people to favorite their co-
ethnics in other aspects than through politics, which should, in turn, lead to corruption. Such a causal 
relationship should probably not be captured by the model. But consider that in many non-urban 
cases, ethnic groups in fractionalized countries live separated from each other. If ethnic fractionali-
zation leads directly to corruption, without being mediated through politics, it would also need to 
work through ethnic in-group favoritism. But why should the local policeman or bureaucrat engage 
in corrupt practices by favoriting his or her co-ethnic locally, when everyone belongs to the same 
group? As an example, if I am a Muslim living in the Northern parts of Nigeria, with the largest 
majority of Muslims, I will likely not meet many Christians, and there would be little room for the 
police or bureaucrats to treat me better than they treat Christians. I would, however, statistically most 
likely vote for the APC, alike most other Muslim-dominated parts of Nigeria. It is hard to see how 
the local level corruption in somewhat ethnic homogeneous entities can be created by ethnic frac-
tionalization in the national parliament. 
The least complicated explanation for such a phenomenon should be that the country-wide ethnic 
fractionalization creates corruption at the state level, which then trickles back down to the local level 
and also affects local communities, which then leads to ethnic voting, but the explanation that ethnic 
fractionalization and corruption are unrelated has a higher degree of parsimony over such a mecha-
nism. 
Case selection and scope 
The study will be conducted by a statistical evaluation of 31 African countries. Several reasons moti-
vate the use of ethnic voting in Africa. To begin with, the variance is greater, both in terms of ethnic 
fractionalization and corruption, as compared with for example many European states. Second, the 
data from the Afrobarometer include better measures of ethnicity, but also the perception of corrup-
tion, as compared with other large surveys such as the European Values Survey, World Values Survey, 
Lapop, and other similar sources. It should be noted that the scope of this study is ethnic in-group 
favoritism in electoral democracies, via the study of ethnic voting. The study of ethnic in-group fa-
voritism in countries without electoral democracy would require other methods 
The spread of ethnic voting, corruption, and ethnic fractionalization is large in the population. Bot-
swana, with a Bayesian Corruption Indicator score of 37, has a lower perception of corruption than 
for example South Korea and a comparable level with many EU countries, such as Poland, Lithuania, 
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Cyprus, and Malta. Guinea with a score of 69, ranks higher than countries such as Syria, Congo, and 
Iraq. The dataset also includes countries such as Uganda, where the largest ethnic group makes up 
only 16.5 percent of the population, with another eight ethnic groups in the span of 3-10 percent. 
However, the dataset also includes Lesotho, with almost no ethnic differences within the population. 
Posner (2005) suggests that his findings regarding ethnic voting in Zambia should be possible to 
generalize to environments such as Los Angeles as well. I would be cautious when trying to generalize 
the results and aim at being consistent with how the ethnic groups are defined. The large variance in 
the observed variables does, however, indicate a degree of generalizability, at least within the spec-
trum we have in the data. 
Analyses 
The first analysis will study the correlation between corruption and ethnic voting, by the use of re-
gression analysis on a panel dataset consisting of the included countries and years in the Afrobarom-
eter dataset. As we can see in the appendix, the data has some issues with heteroskedasticity, meaning 
that a robust regression will be applied, rather than an OLS regression. Normally, a random-effects 
or linear-effects population-averaged would probably be applied for a short, unbalanced dataset such 
as this. However, ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization are constant over the period in the 
dataset, meaning that the variables will be omitted in a linear fixed-effects model, where the internal 
change in each country is measured, which is also one of the two components in a random-effects 
model. I will, therefore, study the between-effects exclusively, meaning the study of the difference 
between countries. The time-component will, therefore, be averaged out, and just the country cases 
will be compared in the regression. 
Two key variables that will be introduced as control variables are ethnic fractionalization and ethnic 
polarization. Ethnic fractionalization is defined as the probability that two randomly selected people 
in a country will belong to different ethnic groups, i.e. 1 − ∑ 𝜋𝑖
2𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠
𝑖=1 , where 𝜋𝑖 denotes the 
relative size of ethnic group i. A country with only one ethnic group would receive the value of 0, 
while a hypothetical case in which every citizen of a country belongs to different ethnicities, the 
fractionalization would be 1. Ethnic polarization is, on the other hand, a measure of the distance 
from the current distribution of relative sizes between ethnic groups in a country, to a completely 
bipolar distribution, which should represent the highest level of polarization. The formula for ethnic 
  17 
polarization is, therefore 1 − ∑ (
1
2
−𝜋𝑖
1
2
)2𝜋𝑖
𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠
𝑖=1 , where 𝜋𝑖 has the same meaning (Montalvo 
& Reynal-Querol, 2005). 
GDP per capita is used as a control variable, as the level of economic development is likely to affect 
voting behavior. The size of the population is used as a control variable, as it is correlated with the 
perception of corruption, although the causality is debated (Knack & Azfar, 2003). The level of de-
mocracy is used to control for that autocratic regimes could either promote or prevent ethnic politi-
cization. Years of democracy is used as new democracies lack the party system stability of older 
democracies, which could affect the outcome in both directions. The level of education is used both 
as a proxy for human development and because it is not implausible that the level of education can 
promote tolerance. The age distribution in a country is one indicator of human development and can 
affect the stability of election results over time. 
Apart from the regression, I will also conduct an instrumental variable study, to further gain 
knowledge regarding the causal direction of the relationship between corruption and ethnic fraction-
alization, an instrumental variable regression will be presented. This is done by replacing corruption 
in the model with a measure that is correlated with corruption without being correlated with ethnic 
fractionalization or the error term. If we find that the instrumental variable is correlated with ethnic 
voting as well, we will have an indication of that the causes of corruption that should be uncorrelated 
with ethnic fractionalization will also lead to more ethnic voting. If the instrumental variable is un-
correlated with the error term, it is also an indication against an omitted variable bias. In the first 
stage of the instrumental variable regression, the components that will constitute the instrumental 
variable are used in a linear regression to establish a linear model in which the new components will 
estimate corruption. 
An essential general issue with all these components is that the model assumes that the instrumental 
variable is unrelated to unmeasured causes of the dependent variable (Sovey & Green, 2011). In this 
case, it is in particular essential to make sure that the instrument is not affected by the degree of 
ethnic fractionalization. Therefore, the assumption that ethnic fractionalization leads to corruption 
means that an instrument that is caused by corruption could be affected by the existence of ethnic 
fractionalization. I will therefore specifically look for instruments that cause corruption, and that are 
neither correlated with ethnic fractionalization nor with ethnic voting. Press freedom is used as I 
theorize that a free press has better preconditions of detecting corruption and demand responsibility. 
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Similarly, civil society interest groups will help to hold the political class accountable. Uneven eco-
nomic development is chosen as it is a documented source of corruption (Uslaner, Svendsen, Svend-
sen, Svendsen, & Elgar, 2019). 
In the appendix, there is a thorough checklist of the properties of the instrumental variables, as sug-
gested by Sovey and Green (2011). In sum, the analysis of the instrument points towards that it is 
appropriate to use in this study. The exclusion criteria, meaning that there should be no risk of that 
the components of the instrumental variable affect the dependent variable other than through the 
instrumental variable, is likely met. This is confirmed by a value of the F-test above the rule-of-thumb 
of 10, meaning that the instrument is not likely to be correlated with the error terms, so the theoretical 
motivations of the construction of the instrument are not refuted. 
Results 
TABLE 1, ROBUST REGRESSION WITH ETHNIC VOTING AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Ethnic voting 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Corruption    .003 .005** .005* 
(0-100)       
Ethnic Fractionalization -.005  .050 -.055  .009 
(0-1)       
Ethnic Polarization  .113 .130  .214** .217* 
(0-1)       
GDP/cap (log) .008 -.001 -.004 .011 -.002 -.003 
       
Population (log) -.003 .003 .002 -.008 -.003 -.003 
       
Democracy .009 .009 .009 .011 .013 .013 
(-10 - 10)       
Population aged <14 (log) -.277 -.233 -.260 -.343* -.291* -.293* 
       
Education level (log) -.127 -.089 -.090 -.180* -.091 -.088 
       
Years of democracy (log) -.028 -.025 -.025 -.026 -.021 -.021 
       
R-squared .217 .324 .333 .324 .556 .551 
Adj, R-squared -.021 .098 .067 .078 .379 .338 
No, Observations 94 87 87 94 87 87 
No, Groups 31 29 29 31 29 29 
p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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TABLE 2, INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE 2SLS REGRESSION, ROBUST TO HETEROSKEDASTICITY, 
WITH ETHNIC VOTING AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND AN INSTRUMENT FOR CORRUPTION  
Model  1  2  3 
Ethnic voting 1st stage 
2nd 
stage 1st stage 
2nd 
stage 1st stage 
2nd 
stage 
Corruption  .006  .010  .011* 
(0-100)       
Ethnic Fractionalizat-
ion 9.698 -.206   11.412 -.211 
(0-1)       
Ethnic Polarization   -8.534 .280** -7.348 -.314** 
(0-1)       
GDP/cap (log) -1.394 -.012 -4.800* -.049 -4.917 -.039 
       
Population (log) 1.428 -.007 1.628 .004 1.128 -.314 
       
Democracy -.877 .009 -1.090 .018* -1.129 .024* 
(-10 - 10)       
Population aged <14 
(log) 8.989 -.186 24.545* -.386 25.156 -.321** 
       
Education level (log) -3.143 -.061 -.842 .004 .494 -.012 
       
Years of democracy 
(log) 2.161 .000 3.553 -.020* 4.356 -.036 
       
Press freedom .643***  .592***  .713***  
(1-100)       
Civil society interest 
groups 2.359**  3.092***  2.835***  
(0-10)       
Uneven economic de-
velopment  -2.017  -2.253  -3.0230  
(0-10)       
1st stage F-test 11.253  10.120  11.495  
Kleibergen-Paap 13.176  11.743  12.465  
 (p=0.004)  (p=0.008)  (p=0.006)  
Hansen J 1.224  3.289  3.875  
 (p=0.542)  (p=0.1931)  (p=0.1441)  
R-squared between  0.253  0.370  0.429 
No. Observations  87  80  80 
No. Groups  29  27  27 
p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
 
Individual study 
This part of the study will focus on the individual mechanisms of ethnic voting, by investigating 
whether individuals who perceive a high degree of corruption in society will also vote for ethnic 
parties to a greater extent. A multilevel, mixed-effects linear regression will be applied, to answer how 
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much the change in perception of corruption will affect the level of ethnic fractionalization in the 
party of choice. This analysis uses the Afrobarometer round 6, but just respondents that identify with 
parties and have stated ethnicity, which are 21711. The dependent variable, the ethnic fractionaliza-
tion of each party in the survey has been calculated with the help of that the survey collects data on 
the respondent’s ethnicity. If we know the relative size of every ethnic group among the voters for a 
party, we can also calculate the ethnic fractionalization of the voters for the party. The independent 
variable, a corruption index, has been calculated by combining answers to questions regarding the 
perception of corruption in various institutions. I will also control for political attitudes by introduc-
ing an index regarding the attitude to tax-funded services, that has been created in the same manner, 
as well as an index regarding how authoritarian the respondent is. This is a simplified measure of left-
right and GAL-TAN-attitudes based on answers in the Afrobarometer. The country-level control 
variables have been retrieved from the Quality of Government dataset, and have the purpose of 
letting us better measure the specific individual effect. A full description of the variables can be found 
in the appendix. 
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Results 
TABLE 3, MULTILEVEL, MIXED-EFFECTS LINEAR REGRESSION WITH ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION 
IN THE PARTY OF CHOICE AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Fixed effects 
  
Corruption perception -.040*** 
(0-1)  
More state -.001 
(0-1)  
More authoritarian .015*** 
(0-1)  
  
  
Random  
  
Democracy 2.80e-14 
SE: 0.000 
Country level corruption 3.22e-12 
SE: 0.000 
GDP/cap 1.10e-22 
SE: 0.000 
Level 1 cons .740 
SE: .023 
Level 2 cons .016 
SE: 0.000 
  
Log-likelihood 15759.834 
Number of obs 21711 
Number of groups 30 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
The results in table 3 show a significant decrease in multi-ethnicity in the party choice if a voter 
perceives a high degree of corruption, i.e., that voters who perceive more corruption are more prone 
to ethnic voting. As ethnic fractionalization is a somewhat complicated measure, to begin with, as 
explained earlier in this chapter, the perceived outcome of the decrease in ethnic fractionalization will 
depend on how large the fractionalization is, to begin with. It is worth noting that the effect is not of 
an enormous magnitude. A move over the entire spectrum of perception of corruption leads just to 
a .04 decrease in the fractionalization of the political party of one's choice. The effect is nonetheless 
significant at the p<0.001 level.  
The random effects, which measure the differences between each country and the population mean 
are also small, while the effects of an authoritarian attitude is a third in size compared to the effects 
  22 
of perception of corruption. However, authoritarian values have the opposite effect as compared 
with the perception of corruption. 
If we interpret the results, they point towards that people who perceive a higher degree of corruption 
will also vote for more ethnically homogeneous parties. This means that they politically favor their 
ethnic groups, unlike people who do not perceive such high levels of corruption, that vote for more 
ethnically diverse parties. 
If we combine the findings at the country level and the individual level, we can establish that a cor-
relation exists between corruption and ethnic in-group favoritism, measured as ethnic voting. We can 
establish that the causal direction is unlikely the reversed of what is proposed and that the relationship 
is unlikely to be caused by an omitted variable. We have also concluded that there exists an individual 
mechanism in which voters who perceive more corruption will also vote for ethnic parties to a greater 
extent.  
Concluding discussion 
The study finds that ethnic in-group favoritism is a result of corruption, rather than a result of just 
ethnic fractionalization. The findings challenge the previous literature theory, that has primarily sug-
gested that ethnic fractionalization causes corruption through a mechanism of ethnic in-group favor-
itism, and instead points towards that institutions may affect the degree or characteristics of ethnic 
identification among people. The findings of this study are in line with Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) 
who suggest that the roots of contemporary ethnicities can be found in the competition for public 
goods and that state experience has a homogenizing influence on culture and ethnic identity. The 
findings are also not contradicted by Easterly (2001), who finds that institutional strength has an 
absorbing effect on ethnic conflict. Hroch (1993) has observed how the nationalistic idea grows 
stronger as the state is put into crisis, as people tend to over-value the protective comfort of their 
national group during such conditions. 
If we assume that the many previous studies that have concluded a correlation between ethnic frac-
tionalization and corruption are consistent with the mechanisms in the real world, there should be at 
least three plausible explanations for such a relationship. The first type of causal relationship, that 
ethnic fractionalization leads to corruption has already received most of the attention of this paper, 
and I have suggested that such a relationship is implausible based on the results of this study. The 
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second causal relationship, a spurious relationship in which a third variable causes both ethnic frac-
tionalization and corruption can be plausible. My most likely candidate for such a variable would be 
related to the strength of state institutions, such as state capacity. The relationship between ethnic in-
group favoritism and corruption in non-democracies such as USSR or SFR Yugoslavia, which were 
two countries with a relatively high degree of corruption but in comparison low levels of ethnic 
conflicts during the socialist rule as compared to later levels, are a weak spot in my theory that evolves 
much around corruption. The two countries did, however, have a fair share of state capacity despite 
corruption, which could be a contending explanation to corruption. A spurious relationship that does 
not revolve around state institutions should either be missing among the control variables, or its 
effect should be very strong but indirect on both variables, while it is also consistent with the 2SLS 
study and the individual study in this paper. Such a relationship is not impossible, but implausible. 
The third explanation is reverse causality, in which corruption causes ethnic fractionalization. An 
implicit consequence of my theory is that the natural states that rely on culture or ethnicity still rely 
on personalization and patron-client networks. This means that they can likely not scale up without 
negative consequences. If they grow in size, they will eventually become too big for a personalized 
rule, leading to a more impersonal bureaucracy that should decrease corruption. Or they should di-
vide into new natural states, that can either choose to cooperate or engage in conflict for the benefit 
of the elites in the state. If we would extrapolate this argument, an increase in corruption leads to a 
more natural state-like rule, which should fractionalize larger collective identities over time. Vice 
versa, North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) conclude that open-access societies lead to more inclusive 
collective identities. Hobsbawm (2012) has also studied the effects of state institutions on ethnic 
characteristics and suggests that state institutions such as conscription will help to build a large 
enough base for a collective identity2. Based on their theories, together with my application of them 
and the results from the analyses in this paper, a causal direction from corruption to ethnic fraction-
alization seems to be the most likely candidate among the discussed explanations of the correlation. 
The roots of the natural state in the ability of an elite actor to uphold security and resolve conflicts 
bear much resemblance with the roots of capitalism in historical materialism. Marx (1867) suggests 
                                                     
2 Only half the French people spoke at least some French at the time of the French 
revolution, and somewhere between 12-13 percent of the population spoke what could be 
considered the French language, but the share increased as institutions such as conscription 
were introduced. 
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that the mechanisms involved in the accumulation of capital are the driving forces of historical de-
velopment. The first accumulation of capital is, however, the so-called primitive accumulation, in 
which one actor uses force to steal goods from others. I.e., the actor with the greatest violence po-
tential at an early stage becomes the first capitalist and the first actor to create extractive institutions 
that depend on the surplus-value of other actor’s labor. Olson (1993) has proposed similar roots of 
the state in the theory of how the roving bandit, who strikes different villages at different times 
becomes a stationary bandit after some time, i.e. someone who collects taxes in the same manner as 
present-day racketeering. 
The connection between extractive institutions, the surplus-value addressed in Marx’ Capital and 
ethnic fractionalization is perhaps not so far-fetched if we study the case of Papua New Guinea. As 
no plants or animals fit for domestication existed on the island before a migration of farmers that 
was a prerequisite for the neolith revolution in the country, large parts of the jungles that were unfit 
for farming were hunter-gatherer societies until recent centuries (Golson & Hughes, 1980)3. Papua 
New Guinea also happens to be the home of 856 known languages, or 12 percent of all the languages 
in the world, with just 0.11 percent of the world’s population. Even if hunter-gatherer communities 
are also dependant upon the absence of violence, and even if tribal warfare has been observed in as 
primitive societies like those of gorillas, the results of violent clashes in pre-neolithic societies will 
never result in extractive institutions, as there is no surplus-value to extract from enemy tribes, due 
to the low productivity. The lack of surplus value will make the practices of the stationary bandit 
impossible, meaning that the pre-conditions for elites imposing their culture upon citizens will be 
absent. Combined with the findings of Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) regarding the roots of ethnicity in 
the competition for public goods, it seems as if the material conditions for a large ethnic fractionali-
zation during pre-industrial times can have been relative overpopulation in relation to the production 
in the agriculture, provided that such practices existed. 
The relevance of this study on the use of ethnic fractionalization in political science and related fields 
has already been discussed, but the study could have some applications on the outside world. The 
                                                     
3 Olsson and Hibbs Jr (2005) conclude that: “These native New Guineans [are described 
as] “walking encyclopedias” with detailed knowledge of every imaginable use that could be 
made of hundreds of plants and animals. This profound knowledge of the natural envi- 
ronment, gained through thousands of years of observation, has also been recorded among 
other primitive peoples. [...] The notion that native New Guineans or Aboriginals perhaps 
might have “missed” some crops or animals that could have been successfully domesticated 
therefore seems highly unlikely.” 
  25 
extent of migration is perhaps currently greater than at any point earlier in history, which will inevi-
tably lead to that different ethnicities live side by side more than before. From the basis of earlier 
studies and my contribution, an issue of societal relevance could receive different answers or expla-
nations if studied closer: Will the migration, and the ethnic fractionalization that entails, lead to a 
greater degree of corruption or generally a lower human development in the receiving country? Based 
on the previous knowledge of ethnic fractionalization, the answer should probably be yes, but I would 
rather suggest no - it should rather depend upon the institutions in the receiving country. I hypothe-
size that ethnic identity politics could be more common among immigrant groups that have experi-
enced more corruption in their home countries, than in the rest of the population, but that this dif-
ference should decrease over time, as the incentives to take part in a natural state will disappear when 
the surrounding open-access society provides better security and better opportunities. 
In summary, this study includes both a theory and results that support an alternative explanation of 
the correlation between ethnic fractionalization and corruption. The connection between state insti-
tutions and ethnicity could provide to be an interesting field for further studies, which could reshape 
the understanding of both the origins of the state and the meaning of ethnic homogeneity or plural-
ism in society. 
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APPENDIX 
Country-level studies 
TABLE 4, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF COUNTRY-LEVEL STUDIES 
Name Description Obs. Mean Min Max 
St. 
dev Source 
Data-
set na
me 
Ethnic voting 
A calculated score from the Afrobarometer. See 
El Koubi (2016) for methodology 95 .152 .029 .664 .103   
Corruption 
Bayesian corruption indicator. A compo-
site measure of the perception of corruption, 
made from over 20 surveys with 80 questions. 95 
55.58
2 
31.82
3 
68.8
47 
9.13
0 
Teorell et 
al. 2019. Origi-
nal source: Standaert 
2015 
bci_bc
i 
Ethnic Polari-
zation 
Index of ethnic polarization as described in the 
method chapter 87 .521 .017 .897 .199 
Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol 2005 
Ethnic Fracti
onalization 
Index of ethnic fractionalization, involving an in-
dex of racial and lingual characteristics. 94 .687 .255 .930 .179 
Teorell et 
al. 2019. Origi-
nal source: Alesina, D
evleeschauwer, East-
erly, Kurlat, and Wacz
iarg 2003. 
al_eth
nic 
Populat-
ion aged 
<14 (log) 
Total population between the ages 0 to 14 as a 
percentage of the total population. 95 3.712 2.940 
3.91
7 .171 
Teorell et 
al. 2019. Origi-
nal source: Kauf-
mann, Kraay, and Ma
struzzi 2010 
wdi_p
op14 
Populat-
ion (log) Total polulation. 95 
16.32
3 
12.20
6 
19.0
41 
1.33
4 
Teorell et 
al. 2019. Origi-
nal source: Kauf-
mann, Kraay, and Ma
struzzi 2010 
log_p
op 
GDP/cap (log
) 
GDP per capita based on purchasing power 
parity. 95 7.899 6.475 
9.95
7 .872 
Teorell et 
al. 2019. Origi-
nal source: Kauf-
mann, Kraay, and Ma
struzzi 2010 
log_g
dp 
Democracy 
Polity measure ranging from -10 (strongly auto-
cratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). 95 5.158 -4 10 
3.58
0 
Teorell et 
al. 2019. Origi-
nal source: Mar-
shall, Jag-
gers, and Gurr 2018 
p_po-
lity2 
Education le-
vel (log) 
One of the three sub-categories in the hu-
man development index. Consists of eight indi-
cators from five different sources. 95 3.865 3.277 
4.44
6 .265 
Teorell et 
al. 2019. Origi-
nal source: Founda-
tion 2017 
iiag_e
du 
Years of de-
mocracy (log
) 
Calculated uninterrupted years of democracy, 
defined as a value above 0 in the polity2-scale. 95 2.240 0 
4.26
3 
1.22
2   
Press free-
dom 
Measures the press freedom in the country, and 
the efforts made by the government to see to 
that press freedom is respected. 94 
25.01
1 5.5 54 
10.3
92 
Teorell et 
al. 2019. Origi-
nal source: Bor-
ders 2018 rsf_pfi 
Civil soci-
ety inte-
rest groups 
To what extent is there a network of cooperative 
associations or interest groups to mediate be-
tween society and the political system? 
Data available every second year 2005-2017, 
so the 2007 value is used for Afrobarome-
ter round 3, and the 2015 value is used for 
Afrobaromater round 6. 88 5.614 2 10 
1.57
9 
Teorell et 
al. 2019. Origi-
nal source: Stiftung 20
18 bti_ig 
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Uneven eco-
nomic deve-
lopment 
Includes measures related to the GINI coeffi-
cient, the income share of the top and bottom 
10%, slum population, etc. 92 7.674 3.5 9.7 .983 
Teorell et 
al. 2019. Origi-
nal source: Haken et 
al. 2015 
ffp_ue
d 
 
Individual study 
Below are to begin with the definitions of the variables used in the study. Then follows descriptive 
statistics of the variables. All data is taken from Afrobarometer round 6 unless specified otherwise 
Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2015. 
 
Partifrak: ethnic fractionalization in the party of choice, as calculated from the Afrobarometer data. 
See chapter 3 for a closer description of the measure. 
Corruption perception: index about perception of corruption composed by answers to the follow-
ing questions in Afrobarometer: 
Q53A: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you 
heard enough about them to say: The President* and Officials in his Office? *or prime minister, 
depending on the most powerful leadership role 
Q53B: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you 
heard enough about them to say: Members of Parliament? 
Q53C: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you 
heard enough about them to say: Government Officials? 
Q53D: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you 
heard enough about them to say: Local government councilors? 
Q53E: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you 
heard enough about them to say: Police? 
Q53F: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you 
heard enough about them to say: Tax Officials (e.g. Ministry of Finance officials or Local Govern-
ment tax collectors) 
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Q53G: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you 
heard enough about them to say: Judges and Magistrates? 
More state: index about the economic relation between the individual and the state, composed by 
answers to the following questions: 
Q26E: For each of the following actions, please tell me whether you think it is something a good -
citizen in a democracy should always do, never do, or do only if they choose: Pay taxes they owe to 
government 1=Never do 2=Do only if they choose 3= Always do 
Q44: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. 
Statement 1: Citizens must pay their taxes to the government in order for our country to develop. 
Statement 2: The government can find enough resources for development from other sources with-
out having to tax the people. 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 
3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2, 5=Agree with neither 
Q65C: If the government decided to make people pay more taxes or user fees to increase spending 
on public health care, would you support this decision or oppose it? 1=Strongly oppose, 2=Some-
what oppose, 3=Neither support nor oppose, 4=Somewhat support, 5=Strongly support , 6=It de-
pends (e.g., on size of the increase) 
More authoritarian: composed by the following variables: 
Q16: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1or Statement 2. 
Statement 1: Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies. State-
ment 2: We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves of it. 
1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 
4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2, 5=Agree with neither 
Q30: Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? Statement 1: Democracy is 
preferable to any other kind of government. Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic 
government can be preferable. Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of 
government we have. 1=Statement 3: Doesn’t matter, 2=Statement 2: Sometimes non-democratic 
preferable, 3=Statement 1: Democracy preferable 
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Q33: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. 
Statement 1: Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many 
political parties in [ENTER COUNTRY]. Statement 2: Many political parties are needed to make 
sure that [ENTER NATIONALITY] have real choices in who governs them. 1=Agree very strongly 
with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with 
Statement 2, 5=Agree with neither 
Level of democracy: Polity measure ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly demo-
cratic). p_polity2 in Teorell et al. (2019). Original source: Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2018 
 
GDP per capita (log): GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity. Log-transform applied, 
because of skewness of distribution. wdi_gdppppcur in Teorell et al. (2019). Original source: Kauf-
mann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010 
 
Control of Corruption: country-level measure of perception of corruption. wbgi_cce in Teorell et 
al. (2019). Original source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010 
In table 5 we can see the descriptive statistics of the variables 
TABLE 5, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
Variable name num mean min max sd 
Party fractionalization 32,472 .7203501 0 .9489706 .2140973 
Perception of corruption 24,829 .4783423 0 1 .2267099 
More state 31,928 .3507315 0 1 .1019617 
More authoritarian 28,643 .3060754 0 1 .2395673 
Democracy 32,472 5.141907 -4 10 3.513579 
Corruption 31,28 -.5723053 -1.30416 .9495435 .5039418 
GDP/cap (log) 32,472 6689.129 796.9608 60028.93 10606.51 
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HISTOGRAMS 
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FIGURE 4, HISTOGRAMS OF THE USED VARIABLES IN THE COUNTRY-LEVEL REGRESSION
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FIGURE 5: HISTOGRAMS OF THE USED VARIABLES IN THE INSTRUMENT VARIABLE STUDY 
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FIGURE 6: HISTOGRAMS OF THE USED VARIABLES IN THE INDIVIDUAL STUDY 
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REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS 
Multicolinearity 
In table 6, we can observe that the level of democracy and the years of democracy are above the rule-
of-thumb value of 5, which is likely as the years of democracy is built based on the continuity of the 
democracy variable. After the removal of years of democracy, we observe no values above 5, as seen 
in table 7. In table 8, we can observe the results of the regression when the variable years of democ-
racy is omitted. The significance generally increases, and the effect becomes slightly stronger. 
TABLE 6, MULTICOLINEARITY SCORES 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Democracy 7.88 0.126868 
Years of democracy (log) 7.62 0.131229 
Population aged <14 (log) 4.71 0.212234 
GDP/cap (log) 3.83 0.260910 
Education Level (log) 2.94 0.339569 
Corruption 2.26 0.443317 
Population (log) 1.63 0.612461 
Ethnic fractionalization 1.62 0.617845 
Ethnic polarization 1.47 0.679140 
Mean VIF 3.77 
 
 
 TABLE 7, MULTICOLINEARITY SCORES AFTER REMOVAL OF YEARS OF DEMOCRACY 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Population aged <14 (log) 4.67 0.214109 
GDP/cap (log) 3.48 0.287638 
Education Level (log) 2.92 0.342560 
Corruption 2.23 0.449107 
Ethnic fractionalization 1.59 0.627504 
  39 
Population (log) 1.55 0.643733 
Ethnic polarization 1.44 0.693241 
Democracy 1.31 0.762704 
Mean VIF 2.40 
 
TABLE 8, ROBUST REGRESSION WITHOUT YEARS OF DEMOCRACY 
Ethnic voting 4 5 6 
Corruption .005* .006** .006** 
(0-100)    
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.050  -0.005 
(0-1)    
Ethnic Polarization  .213** .212* 
(0-1)    
GDP/cap (log) 0.003 -0.008 -0.007 
Population (log) -0.010 -0.005 -0.005 
Democracy 0.006 .008* .008* 
(-10 - 10)    
Population aged <14 (log) -.399* -.296* -.295* 
Education level (log) -.225** -0.091 -0.106 
R-squared 0.435 0.569 0.567 
Adj. R-squared 0.263 0.426 0.394 
No. Observations 94 87 87 
No. Groups 31 29 29 
 
Heteroskedasticity during OLS regression 
In table 9 follows the regression before correcting for heteroskedasticity by use of robust regression. 
Table 10 and 11 indicates that the data has problems with heteroskedasticity, which leads to the use 
of robust regression. 
 
TABLE 9, OLS REGRESSION WITH ETHNIC VOTING AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Ethnic voting Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Corruption    0.008 .009* .010* 
(0-100)       
Ethnic Fractionalization -.172  -.152 -0.209  -0.183 
(0-1)       
Ethnic Polarization  .161 .136  0.253 0.226 
(0-1)       
GDP/cap (log) -.025 -.049 -.037 -0.008 -0.033 -0.018 
Population (log) .004 .010 .016 -0.010 -0.003 0.003 
Democracy .001 .006 .008 0.007 0.015 0.018 
(-10 - 10)       
Population aged <14 (log) -.128 -.219 -.158 -0.224 -0.336 -0.267 
Education level (log) -.091 -.059 -.086 -0.087 -0.034 -0.065 
Years of democracy (log) .015 .002 -.004 0.007 -0.012 -0.021 
R-squared .125 .151 .185 0.265 0.357 0.405 
Adj. R-squared -.141 -.131 -.141 -0.003 0.100 0.124 
No. Observations 94 87 87 94 87 87 
No. Groups 31 29 29 31 29 29 
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TABLE 10: CAMERON & TRIVEDI’S DECOMPOSITION OF IM-TEST 
Heteroskedasticity 29.00 28 0.4125 
Skewness 8.00 9 0.5341 
Kurtosis 4.32 1 0.0377 
Total 41.32 38 0.3277 
TABLE 11: BREUSCH-PAGAN / COOK-WEISBERG TEST FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY 
chi2(1) = 5.57 
Prob >chi2 = 0.0183 
 
ETHNIC VOTING SCORES 
TABLE 12, CALCULATED ETHNIC VOTING SCORES FROM AFROBAROMETER 3-6 
 
Round    
Country 3 4 5 6 
     
Algeria    0.1743349 
Benin 0.1341196 0.1577043 0.160517 0.172181 
Botswana 0.0518673 0.0535502 0.0520464 0.0451351 
Burkina Faso  0.2361726 0.1623485 0.1213898 
Burundi   0.6642144  
Cameroon   0.0945853 0.0795054 
Cape Verde 0.2319027 0.1787482  0.108141 
Cote d’Ivoire   0.5151948 0.2578199 
Gabon    0.1460714 
Ghana 0.2187126 0.2081557 0.2350929 0.2393313 
Guinea   0.3597646 0.3657575 
Kenya 0.1084234 0.1954245 0.1492057 0.2112517 
Lesotho 0.0999087 0.0671755 0.0451729 0.0406236 
Liberia  0.0602237 0.0710765 0.0397666 
Madagascar 0.0998412 0.1110948 0.0738843 0.080418 
Malawi 0.128453 0.1561377 0.1151922 0.1369964 
Mali 0.0322842 0.0415885 0.0536527 0.0681547 
Mauritius   0.3188097 0.2700564 
Morocco    0.1585895 
Mozambique 0.2036528 0.156498 0.1201208 0.1711715 
Namibia 0.2777414 0.2922999 0.2903441 0.2713821 
Niger   0.1595229 0.2193528 
Nigeria 0.1329415 0.0938054 0.1310653 0.143357 
Sao Tome and Principe    0.3327368 
Senegal 0.1903325 0.139003 0.1161529 0.1339343 
Sierra Leone   0.2800359 0.27438 
South Africa 0.136182 0.1080908 0.1369537 0.1079517 
Tanzania 0.1127852 0.0623846 0.0287226 0.0407626 
Togo   0.1142364 0.0938591 
Togo     
Uganda 0.093046 0.0671997 0.0589902 0.0842157 
Zambia 0.1015217 0.0982467 0.1070491 0.1108115 
Zimbabwe  0.1335044 0.0812928 0.109229 
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INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE CHECKLIST 
Below is a checklist for appropriate use of instrumental variables in political science, created by Sovey 
and Green (2011), that will be applied on the choice of instrumental variables in this study. 
 
What is the estimand? The estimand is perception of corruption, which is not an exact measure of 
the “true” extent of corruption. Press freedom and civil society interest groups could have a gate-
keeping function against corruption, if corrupt practices have a larger chance of being detected. 
It has been rather hard to compare the composition of this instrumental variable to that of others, 
just because most accessible studies that use corruption as an instrumental variable use ethnic frac-
tionalization as an instrument (Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 2002; Mauro, 1998; De Jong & 
Bogmans, 2011; Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2019). 
 
Is the instrumental variable independent of the potential outcomes? There could be reason to 
question the homogeneity of the causal effect. Press freedom and the extent of civil society interest 
group could all be related to practices of grand corruption. However, news media, social media or 
action groups would probably have little interest in the average persons wrongdoings, i.e. petty cor-
ruption. Also Uslaner (2008) suggests that, although petty corruption might be correlated with ine-
quality, inequality is a much better suited explanation for grand corruption. 
This might however relate to another fundamental issue of the research design, namely that a more 
specific measure of grand corruption could be better suited as a means to explain the causal link 
between perception of corruption and ethnic voting. 
Explain why it is plausible to believe that the instrumental variable is unrelated to unmeas-
ured causes of the dependent variable. 
The two issues I have aimed to address here are both the case of a reverse causality, i.e. that ethnic 
voting causes corruption. The second issue I have aimed to avoid are that the independent variables 
could be systematically related to unobserved causes of the dependent variable. I have identified the 
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greatest risk here to be if variables related to ethnic divisions, such as ethnic fractionalization or ethnic 
polarization, are both causing ethnic voting and corruption. 
For both reasons, I have regarded variables caused by corruption as unfitting, as they hypothetically 
could be affected by a corruption that is in turn affected by either ethnic voting or e.g. ethnic frac-
tionalization. 
Press freedom has a potential weakness, which is that countries with a higher degree of corruption 
could also be more prone to censorship and state-owned journalism. A decrease of press freedom in 
a country could also be a reaction to journalistic investigations of corrupt political elites, that can, in 
turn, be theorized to be the consequence of ethnic fractionalization. However, if we consider that 
many European countries have had a relatively high degree of press freedom for two hundred years, 
it seems as if press freedom could be somewhat resilient to changes in levels of corruption. 
The relationship between corruption and civil society interest groups could be that a decrease in 
corruption is correlated with other measures, such as GDP per capita or welfare, that could be pre-
conditions for civic participation in interest groups. Another explanation could be that corrupt coun-
tries are more autocratic, and therefore persecute interest groups to a higher degree. However, the 
measure is not of the freedom of interest groups, but of the mere existence of them. The emergence 
of e.g. the labor movement in Europe during the 19th century also points towards that a high degree 
of spare time and money are not necessary preconditions for the formation of civil society interest 
groups. 
For the last measure, uneven economic development, a plausible other explanation could be that 
ethnic fractionalization leads to corruption, that leads to uneven economic development. Here, I 
would, however, suggest a historical materialist approach, i.e., the development of productive forces 
and the production relations are the main determinants of the uneven distribution of growth. These 
materialist causes are in turn blind to ethnicities. 
Suppose an instrumental variable is deemed exogenous because it is random or near ran-
dom. Are the exclusion restrictions valid? It is plausible to believe that the instrumental variable 
could have direct effect on the outcome, but most plausible explanations would rather point towards 
that the instrumental variable should increase the value of the dependant variable, and such an effect 
has not been measured. 
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A plausible path from press freedom to ethnic voting is a greater extent of the ethnic press, that could 
lead to ethnic, political mobilization. In this case, press freedom should be positively correlated with 
ethnic voting, but the measures are very uncorrelated. A possible explanation of this is that press 
freedom could lead to a higher degree of journalistic professionalization, as the pressure to be regime-
friendly should decrease. This should, in turn, mean more impartial news coverage. 
A plausible path from civil society interest groups to ethnic voting would be if a higher degree of civil 
society would lead to a greater extent of ethnic interest groups, that could increase ethnic political 
mobilization. If this were the case, these measures would be positively correlated, but there is almost 
no correlation at all between the two in the used dataset. 
Are the instruments weak? As we will see in the results section, the F-value is slightly above 10, 
where instrumental variables with an F-value could be considered as weak as a rule of thumb Sovey 
and Green 2011. Also, the Hansen J statistic and Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic are within the sug-
gested bounds. 
 
Does the instrumental variable have a monotonic effect on the treatment? Press freedom has 
a theoretical maximums. It is plausible that the effect of increased press freedom will decrease with 
higher values of the variable, if we hypothesize information about corruption as a form of disease, 
where newspaper readers are vectors that infect their surroundings with relevant information. 
It is also plausible that both inequality and civil society interest groups have threshold effects, where 
e.g. some inequality might be seen as justified, which can obstruct forms of corruption, or that a 
handful civil society interest groups are manageable for a corrupt regime. 
 
Are the observations subject to spillover effects? I do not exclude that the instruments can be 
subject to spillover effects, but these will probably be more subtle and indirect. 
